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ARGUMENT
In her Brief, Ms. Montoya erroneously contends that the trial court "carefully considered . . .
the [parties'] standard of living prior to separation and the respective standards of living after the
divorce." Appellee's Brief at 11. However, the trial court's alimony award gives Ms. Montoya more
than she needs to support her demonstrated standard of living. The decision below should
therefore be reversed or remanded for additional findings and instructions regarding the calculation
of an appropriate award. Moreover, the trial court's award was improper because in calculating
alimony, it merely divided the parties' aggregate pre-separation income and allocated half of it to Ms.
Montoya instead of making detailed findings on her actual needs.
I.

Even if Appellee's Proposed Corrections to the Findings of Fact
Are Considered, the Alimony Award is Excessive Under the
Tones Factors

"(T]he spouse's demonstrated need must, under Jones, constitute the maximum permissible
alimony award." Bingham v. Bingham, 872 P.2d 1065,1068 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Even accepting the
corrections to the trial court's findings on Ms. Montoya's income urged in Appellee's brief, the trial
court's retroactive and prospective alimony awards in this case exceed the maximum permissible
alimony award established by Bingham.
Given the corrected figures, Ms. Montoya's income was $328.50 per month above her
demonstrated needs from January 2000, when she began living in an apartment, to the time she
moved back into the marital home. See Appellee's Brief at pg. 16, ^f 3. It follows that under the Jones
test, she was not entitled to alimony during that period. Yet the trial court awarded her $500.00 per
month in alimony for this time period. (R. 127, \ 12.)

1

Once Ms. Montoya moved back into the marital home, she was only $111.50 short of her
demonstrated needs. See Appellee's Brief at 16, ^f 3. Accordingly, under the Jones test, she should
have received an alimony award of only $115.50 from the time she moved back into the home.
Instead, the trial court awarded her $500.00 regardless of her financial circumstances. (R. 127, ^[
12.)
Because the trial court's alimony award for both periods exceeds the maximum permissible
alimony award, the trial court's decision should be reversed.
II.

Because the Jones Test is the Only Means Provided by Case
Law or Statute for Determining the Standard of Living, the
Trial Court Erred In Applying An Income-Splitting Test

Ms. Montoya erroneously asserts that a standard of living determination requires an inquiry
apart from the elements of the test in Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985). However, as
explained in Mr. Montoya's original Brief, the purpose of the Jones test is to determine an alimony
recipient's standard of living. Therefore, "the spouse's demonstrated need must, under Jones,
constitute the maximum permissible alimony award." Bingham v. Bingham, 872 P.2d 1065,1068 (Utah
Ct.App. 1994).
That an alimony calculation under the Jones test is meant to determine the recipient spouse's
standard of living is supported by the test's statutory analog, found at Utah Code Ann. § 30-35(7)(a)(i)-(iii). Subsections (i)-(iii) list verbatim the alimony factors related in Jones. Utah Code Ann.
§ 30-3-5(7)(c) further specifies that, in determining alimony under subsection (a), "the court should
look to the standard of living, existing at the time of separation . . . and shall consider all relevant
facts and equitable principles . . . ."
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how the family income was allocated between the parties or their children at the time of separation.1
Instead, the trial court offered only a talismanic mantra, stating that this amount placed the parties
"as close to the pre-separation standard of living as possible . . . .'

(R. 109, f 42.)

The trial court's equalization of the parties' income was improper. Equalization of incomes
should only be the goal "in those cases in which insufficient resources exist to satisfy both parties'
legitimate needs." See Williamson v. Williamson, 983 P.2d 1103,1106 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) (holding
that an alimony modification based only upon income figures is insufficient and that detailed factual
findings regarding the parties' financial circumstances and needs are required); Gardner v. Gardner,
748 P.2d 1076, 1081 (Utah 1988) (holding that the equalization of the parties' standards of living is
appropriate when one spouse has been a full time homemaker for many years and, due to age and
inexperience, has poor prospects of gainful employment); Higlej v. Higley, 676 P.2d 379 (Utah 1983)
(same).
This is not a case where resources were insufficient to meet the parties' demonstrated needs,
as in Williamson. Neither is it a case where the party seeking alimony was found to have litde or no
prospect of providing for herself, as in Gardner or Higley. Thus, an equal splitting of the parties' preseparation income to arrive at an alimony award was improper in the absence of any factual findings
that this amount was necessary to support Ms. Montoya's actual standard of living.

*It should be noted at this point that Ms. Montoya unfairly characterizes Mr. Montoya's
financial situation at the time of separation in stating "[hjusband paid no child support or alimony
from the time of separation until the Amended Decree was entered." See Appellee's Brief at 10.
However, the trial court's initial Decree of August 2,1999 provided for joint custody of the parties'
minor child and permission to joindy occupy the marital home. When Ms. Montoya later moved to
an apartment, she never paid Mr. Montoya child support even though their child remained with him.
The record is void of any suggestion that Mr. Montoya failed to support his minor child or owed
child support to Ms. Montoya.
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CONCLUSION
The trial court's prospective and retrospective alimony awards give Ms. Montoya more than
her actual needs according to the standard of living she demonstrated at tnal. The retrospective
award, for the period during which she lived in an apartment, is $328.50 above her demonstrated
standard of living for that period, even accepting the corrections to the record urged by Ms
Montoya in her Brief. The prospective award provides her with alimony of $500.00 per month,
despite a shortfall in Ms. Montoya's income of only $115.50 below her demonstrated needs.
Appellant therefore respectfully requests that alimony be set at $115.50 for the prospective period,
and that no alimony should be permitted for the retrospective period during which Ms. Montoya
lived in an apartment and had lower expenses.
Moreover, the tnal court's alimony award to Ms. Montoya was improper because it was
rendered through an equal splitting of the parties' aggregate pre-separation income, rather than
through findings regarding her actual needs. Thus, as an alternative to adjusting the alimony award
as requested above, Appellant suggests that tnal court's decision should be remanded for additional
findings regarding Ms. Montoya's standard of living, with instructions on the proper legal standard
for determining an appropnate award.
DATED this

)<r

l

day of March, 2002.
SCALLEY & R E A D I N G ,

P.C.

\ [ . Br&ce Reading
Attorney for Respondent/Appellant
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